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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
 No. 19-3294 
____________ 
 
DJORDJE ZIVKU, 
a/k/a George Zivku, 
 Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review from an  
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Board No. A209-307-987) 
Immigration Judge: John P. Ellington 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 24, 2020 
 
Before: PHIPPS, RENDELL, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 30, 2020 ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Djordje Zivku, a Serbian citizen, seeks review of a denial of his motion to reopen 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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removal proceedings. He claims that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel 
(IAC) when he elected voluntarily to depart the United States. For the reasons that 
follow, we will deny the petition.1 
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees to noncitizens effective 
counsel in removal proceedings.2 Yet, in Matter of Lozada, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) imposed three threshold procedural requirements on all motions to reopen 
premised on an IAC claim: (1) the motion “should be supported by an affidavit of the 
allegedly aggrieved [noncitizen] attesting to the relevant facts”; (2) “former counsel must 
be informed of the allegations and allowed the opportunity to respond,” and any 
response, or failure or refusal thereof, “should be submitted with the motion”; and (3) 
“the motion should reflect whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate 
disciplinary authorities regarding such representation, and if not, why not.”3 
Although we do not “apply a strict, formulaic interpretation of Lozada,”4 our 
Court has “generally agree[d]” that denial of a motion to reopen on Lozada grounds “is 
not an abuse of the [BIA]’s wide-ranging discretion.”5 The “requirements serve as a 
threshold and screening mechanism to help the [BIA] assess the substantial number of 
 
1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Because the BIA both affirmed the 
IJ’s decision and added its own analysis, we review each decision. Contreras v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 665 F.3d 578, 583 (3d Cir. 2012). “We review the denial of a motion to 
reopen for abuse of discretion and may reverse only if the denial is arbitrary, irrational, or 
contrary to law.” Id. 
2 See Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2001). 
3 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988). 
4 Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 106 (3d Cir. 2005) (alteration omitted) (quoting Lu, 
259 F.3d at 133). 
5 Lu, 259 F.3d at 133. 
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[IAC] claims that it receives.”6 Here, Zivku has failed to satisfy both the second and the 
third prongs, and that is enough to doom his petition.7 
Under the second prong, Zivku was required not only to inform James Scallion, 
his former counsel, of the allegations against him, but also to allow Scallion the 
opportunity to respond. The immigration judge (IJ) and the BIA did not abuse their 
discretion in finding that Zivku failed to accomplish the latter. Zivku retained his new 
counsel shortly after his removal hearing on November 2, 2017. Even if, as he argued in 
his motion, it took the immigration court some time to send his new counsel a record of 
the hearing, that issue, as the BIA noted, appears to have been resolved by November 27. 
Nearly one and a half months then elapsed before Zivku sent the requisite letter to 
Scallion on January 10, 2018. And even then, three weeks still remained until the January 
31 deadline—when Zivku had either to depart the country or to move to reopen. 
However, he filed his motion only two days later, providing no indication that Scallion 
received the letter, let alone responded (or failed or refused to respond) to it. Given this 
timeline, Zivku had ample opportunity to notify Scallion of his intent to file a motion to 
reopen and either to receive a response or reasonably to conclude that Scallion would not 
respond.8 
 
6 Fadiga v. Att’y Gen. USA, 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639. 
7 See Lu, 259 F.3d at 134-35 (affirming a denial of a motion to reopen where the 
petitioner failed to meet two of the three Lozada requirements). 
8 “[T]he potential for abuse is apparent,” the BIA wrote in Lozada, “where no mechanism 
exists for allowing former counsel, whose integrity or competence is being impugned, to 
present his version of events if he so chooses, thereby discouraging baseless allegations.” 
19 I. & N. Dec. at 639. 
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For similar reasons, Zivku also did not fulfill the third Lozada requirement. It is 
undisputed that he failed to file a bar complaint before filing his motion, and indeed 
before January 31. Nevertheless, we have “stress[ed] that the failure to file [such] a 
complaint is not fatal if a petitioner provides a reasonable explanation for his or her 
decision.”9 In his motion, Zivku cited our decision in Fadiga v. Attorney General for the 
proposition that “a [petitioner] is not required to file a bar charge where a lawyer 
confessed error and submitted a detailed affidavit regarding ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”10 Yet that is not what occurred here: Scallion did not “fully and openly own[] 
up to his error and provide[] a detailed affidavit attesting to the problems in the 
representation”11 before Zivku moved to reopen. 
Moreover, as noted above, the IJ and BIA reasonably concluded that Scallion was 
not provided an opportunity to respond before the motion was filed. In evaluating failures 
to satisfy Lozada’s bar-complaint prong, we have referred to the policies underlying that 
requirement, among which are “identifying, policing, and correcting misconduct in the 
immigration bar”; “deterring meritless claims of ineffective assistance of counsel”; and 
“reducing the need for an evidentiary hearing.”12 None of these is realized when the 
former counsel is deprived of an opportunity to respond—to acknowledge the error of his 
ways or to present his side of the story. Accordingly, the agency did not abuse its 
 
9 Lu, 259 F.3d at 134 (emphasis omitted). 
10 AR 120 (citing Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 155-57). 
11 Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 156-57. 
12 Rranci v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 540 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Fadiga, 488 F.3d 
at 156). 
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discretion in finding that Zivku failed satisfy the third Lozada prong. 
For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
